Russow raises an excellent point with
her corrments about suffering and consciousness.
As I was writingOf Mice, Models and
Men, I became aware of the lack of good
arguments about the nature of animal suffering.
In fact, the literature on human suf-
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fering is very thin, as well. As a result, I
have been spending the past few years snatching what time I could to investigate the
mental complexity of animals and humans and
to explore the nature of suffering.

While I do not wish to corrment on the
rornpliments that Lilly-Marlene Russow pays my
book, I must admit that her criticisms are
both fair and accurate. For example, despite
my best efforts, there is still unnecessary
jargon.
Also, I did not pay sufficient attention to the philosophical aspects of the
issue and doubt that I could have produced an
adequate analysis, anyway. I did not try to
draw the topics together by analyzing the
similarities and differences between, say,
psychological
research and
toxicological
testing.
Finally, the book grew out of the
problems I had encountered and had tried to
resolve through six years as a critical observer of animal research.
As a result, the
chapters reflect the issues that I have dealt
with, and this explains most of the organizational problems that a reader might encounter.

The biological literature is full of
fascinating data. For example, any notion of
pain and suffering has to contend with the
fact that one can have pain without suffering.
Patients with pre-frontal lobotomies,
for example, have the same pain-detection
thresholds as no.rmal people, but the pain
does not seem to "bother"them as much (if at
all) •
When asked about this, these individuals say that they feel the pain (and they
will jt.nnp if pricked unexpectedly with a pin)
but the"agony" is no longer there. Interestingly, people with lobotanies also do not
appear to have verbally-mediated anxieties-that is, anxieties associated with particular
words. Perhaps language possession is, after
all, a morally relevant characteristic.

Russow comments on a reference to "apparent philosophical sophistry" and notes
that this tends to stereotype the theoretical
aspects of the issue in a rather negative
light and then further suggests that the book
would have been improved with a better theoretical analysis of such concepts as "suffering" and "consciousness." I agree. I apologize for the cheap shot at philosophers,
although I would argue that the adjective
"apparent" should save me from being branded
as another philistine! However, it is difficult for those of us who were trained in the
empirical
sciences to take philosophical
theory as seriously as we should. one of the
comonest corrments I hear from my scientific
colleagues is that moral philosophy is ultimately a matter of personal preference.
It
is often impossible to get beyond this notion
no matter how much one tries to insist on
theoretical coherence and internal consisten-

Consciousness raises a whole host of
other questions and is, to biology, as quantum theory is to physics. When investigating
these phenomena, it becomes more and more
difficult to distinguish between empirical
data and metaphysical theories. Any analysis
that claims to be thorough must deal with
both empirical science and
philosophical
theory. Griffin I s books on anirral consciousness are an interesting example of this.
Griffin provides us with a wealth of data and
with some theory, but, although he will acknowledge when challenged that his arguments
raise considerable moral questions, he does
not address these questions at all in his
books.
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I have been particularly intrigued with
the notion of deception.
Many species attempt to deceive competitors and predators.
In nost cases, such deception is not intentional, but it can be very difficult indeed
to decide what is and is not intentional
deception.
Chimpanzees appear to deceive
others intentionally.
There are also observations indicating that baboons may indulge
in intentional deception.
But what of the
broken-wing display of the plover when it
tries to lure potential predators away from
its nest?
My interest in this issue stems
from the fact, that it seems that intentional
deception involves a series of thoughts that
indicate that you are thinking that I am
thinking that you intend some specific action.
This circular reasoning appears to
indicate that you are self-conscious; that
is, you are capable of being the object of
your own thoughts. Intentional deception can
be
studied empirically and distinguished
(albeit with difficulty) from non-intentional
deception.
Of course, one then still has to
indicate what moral relevance, if any, such a
distinction has, but it seems to me that
mental complexity (or mental capacity) is
very imp::)rtant in developing a coherent theory of the noral status of different animals.

(continued from p. 2)
Parental affecti.0n solely in an almost sacred
light.
I do indeed grant that partial affections (not just parental) for those close to
us are brute facts that must be dealt with
whenever rroral duties are under discussion.
I suspect that on a hypothetical sinking
ship, my partial affection would lead me to
prefer saving my dog, that I personally know
and love, to saving a human stranger.
Why
are the partial affections of a person for a
non-human animal automatically dismissed by
Nelson as obviously less "rrorally worthy"
than those of a parent for his/her child? (I
am speaking here of Professor Aiken's chimp.)
Indeed, the love of a person for a pet animal
may closely resemble parental love, without,
however, the ego-supporting "chip off the old
block" element.

In conclusion, I hope to produce, in the
not too distant future, something a little
rrore concrete and satisfying on the nature of
animal suffering and consciousness and its
noral implications.
One does not need a
sophisticated noral theory to criticize some
uses of research anirnals--such as in LD50
testing or in research that causes easily
avoidable suffering or death. However, there
are a lot of research projects that do not
fall into such categories, and we are just
beginning to search for a rrorally satisfactory and consistent public consensus on when
animal research can be justified.
Of Hice,
Hodels and Hen was intended to help define
what some of the questions might be.
It was
my first book on this topic but, I hope, not
my last.

Toward the end of the xenograft article,
Nelson mentions !:lis opinion that there is a
rrorally relevant distinction between animals
and "marginal" humans, in that "marginal"
humans have suffered a so-called tragedy in
"becoming the psychological equals of animals."
A defective human is certainly not,
as Nelson puts it, the psychological equal of
a normal, healthy animal--this is a blatantly
anthropocentric statement. Birth defects are
a natural occurrence--a deformed or internally defective puppy is rejected by its rrother
and dies.
This may be sad" but it is no
tragedy.
A human infant may be born with
many mental and physical defects--why is this
seen as a tragedy?
I f the appeal to the
"tragedy"
of so-called "marginal" humans
automatically places such humans off limits
for medical exploitation, why is not birth ~
an animal in this world considered equally
tragic?
Certainly being granted no rroral
value whatsoever ought to be tragic enough to
warrant exemption from torture.
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